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ABSTRACT 
 
We study the work hours of Australian couples, using a neoclassical labour-supply model 
in which couples choose from a small, realistic set of possible wife-husband working 
hour combinations. We introduce three improvements to this standard model. First, we 
allow partners' preferences about non-market time to be correlated. We also correct the 
estimates to accunt for the fact that we estimate the non-observable wage rates of 
individuals who do not work. Lastly, we allow each individual's preferences for non-
market time to be correlated with her or his wage rate. These changes, which 
substantially enhance the realism of the standard, discretized labour-supply model, also 
have an important impact on the results. We estimate the model using HILDA data and 
find wage elasticities of labour supply - 0.26 for men and 0.50 for women - that are twice 
as large as those found without these three innovations. Using simulation methods, we 
then analyze the expected impact of the 2005/06 Australian tax reform. As a result of the 
tax cuts, we expect working hours to increase by 1.7 per cent for both men and women 
and household after-tax incomes to increase by approximately $60 per week on average. 
For families with two wage earners, each earning between $25,000 and $55,000 per year, 
our model predicts an after-tax increase in income of $38 after accounting for these 
labour supply effects - much larger than the Australian Government's own prediction of 
$12, which does not allow for labour supply effects.  
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to estimate a structural labour-supply model for Australian
couples. We improve upon existing models by making several extensions which better
capture the complexity of couple behaviour. Since individuals choose to take up a job
at a particular wage, it seems intuitively correct that their reservation wage should be
affected by their personal trade-off between having more money and having more free
time. Moreover, partners are not randomly assigned to one another, but instead choose
to be together on the basis of compatibility over a whole set of issues. Thus it also
seems plausible that spouses’ preferences about the relative value of working and non-
working time should be related to one another. Our specification allows for both of
these possibilities–and we find that both matter. We also make an improvement of a
more technical nature (which also matters considerably for our estimates). Specifically,
we account for the fact that wage rates for non-working individuals are estimated within
our model. They are not treated as fixed constants, as has been done in previous work.
Having better labour-supply estimates for Australian couples is important given con-
cerns about the economic and social consequences of population ageing. The Australian
Government predicts, for example, that over the next 40 years the proportion of the
population over the age of 65 will almost double, while the growth in the size of the
workforce-age population will slow to zero (Australian Treasurer (2004)).1 The ensuing
increase in demand for old-age pensions and health care spending – in the face of a more
or less constant tax base – implies that these demographic trends are expected to exert
substantial fiscal pressure on the national budget. Policymakers have responded by con-
sidering a range of policy options targeted towards raising productivity and increasing
labour force participation.
In particular, the Australian tax and transfer system is being reformed in order to
improve the incentives for market work (see Australian Treasurer (2004)). The extent
1See McDonald and Kippen (1999) who discuss Australia’s ageing population in depth.
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to which these reforms are successful in increasing participation, however, is likely to
depend on the labour-supply responses of key groups in society – in particular married
women and lone parents – who appear to be particularly sensitive to the financial return
to market work (see for example, Apps (1991); Eissa and Hoynes (2004); Blundell and
Hoynes (2004); Blundell et al. (2000); Doiron and Kalb (2002); Doiron and Kalb (2005);
Creedy et al. (2003)). Apps (1991) argues, for example, that understanding shifts in the
labour supply of married women is particularly important in predicting the fiscal effects
of demographic change. To the extent that increasing female labour supply results in
an expansion of the tax base, the expected budget deficits arising from the increased
demand for old-age pensions and health care spending due to population ageing become
less problematic.2
Consequently, it is important to understand how different segments of the population
are expected to respond to specific changes in the relative return to market work. To this
end, a small Australian literature has assessed lone parents’ labour-supply responses to
the 1987 reform of family payments (Doiron (2004)), the 2000 reform of the tax system
(Duncan and Harris (2002)), and reductions in the means-tested taper rates (Kalb et al.
(2002), Kalb and Kew (2002), and Creedy et al. (2003)). Somewhat more is known
about the labour-supply responses of married women. Jones and Savage (1996) estimate
a labour-supply model to address the effects of income splitting for taxation purposes
and Scutella (2001) provides wage elasticities for married women.3 The structural model
of Kalb (2002)4 is similar to ours in approach and has been used to study the effect of
changes to the tax and transfer system on married women’s labour supply (Creedy et al.
(2003), Kalb (1999), Kalb (2000), Kalb et al. (2002), and Kalb and Kew (2002)) and
2In fact, Apps (1991) argues that in the face of increasing female labour force participation, changes
to the tax-benefit system may be unnecessary and could induce counter-productive labour-supply re-
sponses by imposing higher effective marginal tax rates on the earnings of married women.
3These papers do not model the joint labour supply of the household, but instead focus on the wife’s
behaviour keeping the husband’s hours and wages fixed.
4The estimation of this model is described in this and two other papers, Kalb (1999) and Kalb
(2000). These papers also provide estimates of married women’s labour supply.
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the effects of the 2000 tax reform on the population (Kalb et al. (2005)).
We use data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
Survey to estimate a structural model of family labour-supply model along the lines of
Van Soest (1995) but – unlike the previous literature in Australia– we estimate wage
and labour-supply equations jointly and, more importantly, take the correlation between
the error terms of the wage equations and unobserved preferences in the labour-supply
equation into account both for individuals and couples.
These estimates are used to simulate the effects of the 2005/06 tax reform package
introduced by the Australian Government in 2005. We find that the effect of the tax cut
is to increase working hours by approximately 1.7 per cent for both men and women,
while after-tax, household income is expected to increase by $60 per week on average.
The estimated labour-supply elasticities and, subsequently the expected effects of the tax
cut, are twice as large as those found when employing a more restricted structural model
of household behaviour similar to that found in other Australian studies. In section
5.2.4 we examine these differences in more detail, demonstrating that it is our modelling
improvements, not some unusual feature of the data, that drive these differences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the importance
of the tax and income support system in understanding the budget constraint faced by
Australian families and discuss how we incorporate this into our estimation procedure.
In Section 3, we outline the data. Section 4 discusses the model and the estimation
procedure. The results, including a comparison with other Australian studies which use
a structural labour supply model and an evaluation of the differences which arise from
our approach, are discussed in Section 5. Our conclusions follow in Section 6.
4
2 The Income Support System and the Family Bud-
get Constraint
Families are assumed to maximize their direct utility over a budget constraint. The
Australian tax and welfare system is complicated, however, which makes the family
budget constraint nonlinear and nonconvex. Specifically, Australian income tax is
individual-based and progressive with the highest marginal tax rate set at 47 per cent.
Low income individuals are entitled to several rebates, the most common of which is the
“low income rebate”. Moreover, individuals and families may be entitled to several of
the thirty-two different income support payments, allowances or pensions described in
Centrelink (2005).
As discussed below, for each possible combination of husband-wife working hours, we
construct the budget constraint using a household-specific calculation of the amount of
income the couple would have at that working hour combination taking taxes and trans-
fers into account. Specifically, we account for four payments from the income support
system–New Start Allowance (including Partner Allowance), Parenting Payment Part-
nered, and Family Tax Benefit Parts A and B–in constructing this budget constraint.
Centrelink records indicate that 83 per cent of partnered Centrelink customers between
the ages of 25 and 59 are receiving one or more of these four payments and no other
payment5. Given the unimportance of other payments for this age group and for sim-
plicity, we do not consider payments such as Disability Pensions, Youth Allowance, and
Austudy Payments. However, we do include all rebates including the various low income
rebates. We briefly describe below the payments included in the budget calculation.
New Start Allowance (NSA) is an unemployment benefit, rather than an unemploy-
ment insurance scheme. Benefits do not depend upon previous employment histories,
however, recipients are subject to income and asset tests and must also undertake job
5This information was provided by Centrelink in an email correspondence and is based upon the
population in the administrative database on 15 July 2005.
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search activity or participate in some other voluntary or work-for-the-dole program.
Partner Allowance provides payments at the same level as NSA, but without the job
search requirement. Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP) is an income-support pay-
ment for partnered individuals with dependent children. PPP is also subject to asset
and income tests and payments become taxable income, further complicating the cal-
culation of the budget constraint. As income increases, PPP and NSA phase out at
different rates. Families with children are also entitled to Family Tax Benefit (FTB).
FTB Part A payments are subject to an income test exclusively on the basis of family
income. FTB Part B is paid when one member of the couple earns below $21,0006 per
year. FTB Part A is not subject to an asset test and payments phase out as family
income increases ending completely at rather high income levels. As of July 1, 2005,
the maximum income at which FTB Part A was paid was $92,139 for a family with one
child under age 18 and $101,495 for a family with 2 children under age 18.7 A further
complication is that while payments are given to individuals, the income tests are ap-
plied to the individual’s income and the partner’s income (although using different rules
for each) or to total household income.
Figure 1 shows the budget constraint for a typical family.8 The budget surface has
two major areas of nonconvexity: at low working hours, when income-support payments
are paid and phased out and at rather high income levels, where FTB is phased out.
Moreover, the surface tilts at several places reflecting the very different marginal tax
rates induced by the tax and transfer system.
These important nonconvexities make continuous structural models inappropriate
for analyzing couples’ labour-supply behaviour. Consequently, we follow Van Soest
6This is the earnings threshold for couples with a child under 5. The allowable earnings threshold
is lower when the youngest child is over the age of 5. All dollar amounts in the paper are in Australian
dollars.
7These are the current thresholds. However, in our estimates, we use the payment rates and program
rules that were in force at the time the survey data were gathered.
8In particular, we consider a family just starting out, with hourly wages just below our sample means,
$23 (husband) and $20 (wife), and small amounts of non-labour income, $123 and $0 respectively. We
assume the family has one 6-year old child.
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(1995) in replacing the actual budget set with a finite number of points and approximate
the utility maximization problem by finding the best point in this finite set. Treating
the budget constraint as a set of discrete points (rather than as continuous) avoids
the requirement that the tax and benefits system is piecewise linear or convex and
allows us to incorporate fixed costs of working, unobserved wages for non-workers, and
nonparticipation into the model.
3 The Household Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia Survey
We use data from the second wave of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia (HILDA) survey to estimate our model. HILDA is a nationally representative
panel survey which provides extensive data on labour market status and working hours,
labour market histories, income of all types, welfare participation, family background,
family formation, and life satisfaction. Approximately 8000 Australian households were
surveyed and our focus is on 3,951 couple-headed families who live in single-family house-
holds in which there are no extended family members or other non-related individuals
present. We have excluded couples in which either partner is disabled or a student. We
have included the self-employed.
We make several other sample restrictions. We drop 1,639 families in which one
member of the couple was over 59 years old or younger than 25 in 2002. We drop
another 899 observations for which key variables (not including the wage) are missing.
Our estimation sample therefore consists of 1,413 couple-headed households.
The distributions of hours worked by husbands and wives are presented in Figure 2.9
Approximately 11 per cent of husbands and 31 per cent of wives reported not working
at wave 2. Most non-working men were unemployed, while most non-working women
9This sample includes both legally married and de facto couples. Consequently we use the term
“husband” to refer to the male partner and “wife” to refer to the female partner.
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were non-participants. Amongst workers, husbands worked on average about 45.6 hours,
while wives worked on average 30.7 hours per week. (See Table 1.)
Hourly wage rates for employed individuals were constructed from the annual gross
income from wages and reported working hours from the previous week. Average hourly
wage rates for those who are working and who reported both wage income and working
hours were approximately $23.70 and $21.30 for men and women respectively.10 The
distribution of log wage rates are uni-modal and roughly symmetric for both men and
women–see Figure 3.
On average, the husbands in our sample are about 42 years of age and their part-
ners are about two years younger. The proportion of men and women receiving higher
education is about the same, though more men than women have completed vocational
education. Approximately, 23 per cent of individuals are foreign-born, and approxi-
mately 8 to 9 per cent speak a language other than English at home. Couples are
generally healthy — only 1.6 per cent of husbands and 1.4 per cent of wives report that
their health is poor. The vast majority of couples are in registered marriages, with less
than 12 per cent living in de facto relationships. The average couple has 1.4 dependent
children under age 21.
4 The Model
We use as our basic framework the discrete, static, neoclassical, structural labour-supply
model developed by Van Soest (1995) in which the family is assumed to maximize utility
over a finite budget set. As discussed in Van Soest (1995) and elsewhere (for exam-
ple, Callan and Van Soest (1996); Euwals and Van Soest (1999); Gong and Van Soest
(2002); and Van Soest et al. (2002)), this approach has several advantages in comparison
10In addition to estimating the wages of the 150 men and the 440 women who did not work simulta-
neously with our labour-supply model (see Section 4), we also estimate wages for the 205 male and 137
female workers who reported positive working hours but who did not report their earnings from wages.
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to models which impose a continuous budget constraint. In particular, by eliminating
the requirement that the budget set and preferences be convex, this approach makes
it computationally feasible to simultaneously incorporate multiple, nonstandard bud-
get restrictions such as fixed costs of working, demand-side hours constraints, nonlinear
taxation, unemployment benefits, and other income sources such as tax rebates. As
discussed above, this is an important advantage given the complexity of the Australian
tax and transfer system and the concomitant non-convexity of the budget constraint.
Furthermore, the model can incorporate many different types of utility specifications in-
cluding those typically referred to in the literature as ‘flexible functional forms.’ Thirdly,
a rich, stochastic specification can be accommodated. We use this third strength to
improve on previous research by allowing the unobserved components of the preference
for non-market time between members of a couple to be correlated and accounting for
correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity in an individual’s hourly wage and
his or her preferences for non-market time. This allows for correlation in unobserved
factors which influence both an individual’s productivity and her or his preferences.
4.1 Model Specification
To be specific, the family chooses the husband’s non-market time (nm), the wife’s non-
market time (nf), and hence the net income (y), (which is composed of after-tax labour
income from both spouses and the family’s nonlabour income) to maximize utility. Util-
ity is given by the direct translog specification, which is a second-order polynomial in
its arguments:
U(v) = v′Av + b′v (1)
where v = (lny, lnnm, lnnf )
′. A is a symmetric 3 × 3 matrix with entries Aij , (i, j =
1, 2, 3) and b = (by, bnm , bnf )
′ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. This specifica-
tion can also be viewed as an approximation of the ‘true’ preference over v. Provided
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standard smoothness and compactness assumptions hold, one can approximate any func-
tion of v to any arbitrary degree of accuracy by choosing the appropriate order of the
polynomial.
We set non-market time equal to TE−h, where h is working hours per week and TE
is the time endowment, which we set equal to 80 hours per week. Following the majority
of the literature, agents in our model choose between market time and non-market time,
but make no distinction between non-market time for leisure and non-market time for
home production. We adopt this simplification for comparability with other discretized
structural models of labour supply which have been estimated for couples in Australia.11
Variation in preferences across families (as well as across individuals within fami-
lies) with different observed and unobserved characteristics is incorporated through the
parameters bnm and bnf :
12
bns =
K∑
k=1
βnsk x
s
k + ǫ
sr, s = m, f (2)
where xs = (xs
1
, . . . , xsK)
′ is a vector of exogenous characteristics including age and family
composition. Following the typical strategy of Hausman type models, the additive error
terms ǫsr are interpreted as random preferences arising from unobserved characteristics.
These errors are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and independent
of x, but they are allowed to be correlated with each other and with the error terms in
each individual’s wage equation. The correlation in partners’ preferences may be due
to unobserved common factors which shift family preferences.
Note that we impose no a priori structure on the correlation allowing marital partners
to be positively sorted on their preferences over non-market time and income. Alterna-
11Apps and Rees (1999), Apps and Rees (2002), and Apps and Rees (2004) show how excluding home
production can affect conclusions about household labour supply. Incorporating home production into
the discretized labour-supply model is an important area of future research.
12Theoretically, all other parameters in the utility function may vary with individuals’ characteristics
as well. However, in practice, the effects would be hard to identify without extraordinarily large samples.
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tively, it may be the case that ‘opposites attract’ and individuals who have a (relative)
aversion to work chose a partner who prefers working relatively more. Our specification
permits either result.
The utility function is required to be increasing in y for the model to be coherent
with its theoretical foundation, implying that each household will choose a point on
the frontier of the household budget set. This modeling approach does not allow this
requirement to be imposed directly. The standard fix in the literature if this require-
ment is not met is to make an adjustment in the likelihood function to ensure that
each household is on the budget frontier. In all of our estimates, as noted below, the
requirement is met and we therefore do not need to make any such adjustments.
As in most of the literature, the individual’s before tax wage rate w is assumed not
to depend on hours worked. Thus, once nm and nf are chosen, after-tax income y is
determined by wm and wf : so that y = y(nm, nf , wm, wf).
In the standard continuous model, the family is assumed to solve the following prob-
lem:
Max U(y, nm, nf) s.t. y ≤ y(nm, nf , wm, wf), nm ≤ TE, and nf ≤ TE. (3)
The econometrician solves this problem using Lagrangian techniques, which are compli-
cated when the budget set becomes non-convex or kinked. Following Van Soest (1995),
however, we replace the budget frontier by a discrete set. In other words, individu-
als may choose from only some of the points along the continuous budget set. The
optimization problem then becomes:
Max U(y, nm, nf) s.t. (y, nm, nf ) ∈ CS(wm, wf) (4)
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where the choice set (CS) is given by
CS(wm, wf) = {(y, nm, nf); y = y(nm, nf , wm, wf);
nm, nf ∈ TE − {0, IL, . . . , (g − 1)IL}} (5)
IL is a fixed interval length which determines the set of possible working hours while g
determines the number of elements in this set. The choice set for both partners with G =
g2 elements is denoted by {(y00, nm0, nf0), (y10, nm1, nf0)..., (yg−1,g−1, nm,g−1, nf,g−1)}. We
set IL to 8 hours and g to 9 so that there will be 81 alternatives for each family.
Random disturbances are added to the utilities of all the alternatives in the choice
set as in the multinomial logit model Maddala (1983):
Uj = U(yj , nmj , nfj) + ǫj (j = 0, ..., G) (6)
where the ǫj are i.i.d. with a type I extreme value distribution, and are independent
of the other error terms in the model and of x. We cannot interpret ǫj as random
preferences, which are already represented by ǫsr in (2). Instead, ǫj can be seen as
the nonsystematic part of the utility associated with alternative j, which could reflect
optimization errors made by the family or might capture demand-side factors – such as
search costs or other job characteristics – which make alternative j unattractive.
We also allow for unobserved fixed costs of working. Following Euwals and Van Soest
(1999), the fixed costs of working are incorporated into the model as a fixed savings from
not working (FR) for the sake of computational convenience. Thus, for those couples
j where either hmj = 0 or hfj = 0, U(yj, nmj , nfj) is replaced by
U(y0 + 1(hmj = 0) ∗ FRm + 1(hfj = 0) ∗ FRf , nmj , nfj). (7)
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FRs is specified as follows:
FRs = δ
′
sts, s = m, f (8)
where ts is a vector of exogenous variables and δs a vector of parameters which we
estimate. Positive fixed savings increase the probability of not working by increasing
the utility of nonparticipation (since utility increases with income). The fixed savings
are fully incorporated into the structural model. An increase in wages will increase the
utility of working while leaving the utility of not working unchanged. (Since the utility
of not working is calculated as the utility at zero hours of work, the wage can have no
effect on this quantity.) Thus, an increase in wages has an unambiguous positive effect
on the participation rate. Of course, an increase in wages for those who are working
has both an income and substitution effect resulting in an ambiguous effect on working
hours which may either increase or decrease. The income and substitution effects can
not be derived algebraically from the model because of its discrete nature. But they
can be easily simulated once parameter values have been estimated (see the discussion
below).13 Consequently, the effects of wage, tax, or benefit changes on participation and
working hours can be easily analyzed in this framework.
The family chooses alternative j if Uj is larger than all the other Ui for i 6= j.
Conditional on ǫsr, xs, wm, and wf the probability that j is chosen is
Pr[Uj ≥ Ui for all i] =
exp(U(yj , nmj , nfj))∑G
i=0 exp(U(yi, nmi, nfi))
(9)
Before-tax wage rates of nonworkers and some workers are not observed (see footnote
10) and hence wages must be predicted for these individuals. The fact that these wage
rates are predicted has to be taken into account in both the estimation and the inference.
To be specific, we form predicted wages for non-workers using both the systematic and
13That the model produces an appropriately signed income effect can be seen from the fourth column
of Table 5 where we simulate the effects of an increase in non-labour income on hours.
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the stochastic parts of the wage equation. Following Gong and Van Soest (2002) and
Van Soest et al. (2002), the wage equation is estimated jointly with the labour-supply
equation in order to account for the selectivity.14 The wage equation is also needed to
allow for correlation between wage rates and random preferences (ǫsr). Consequently,
wages are given by
lnws = π
s′
z
s + ǫws, s = m, f (10)
where zs are vectors of individual characteristics (such as education), πs are vectors of
parameters, ǫws are error terms that are assumed to be normally distributed with mean
zero and independent of zs and xs. We allow ǫws to be correlated with the random
preference term ǫsr in (2). The motivation for including this correlation is that those
individuals with high productivity might also have stronger preferences for working, i.e.
a lower marginal utility of non-market time, in which case one would expect a negative
correlation between ǫws and ǫsr. Alternatively, individuals with higher productivity
might have higher marginal utility of non-market time leading to a positive correlation.
Moreover, measurement errors in wage rates also tend to cause a negative correlation
between wages and hours and this term will incorporate that measurement error.
4.2 Estimation
In the absence of random preferences and unobserved wage rates, the likelihood con-
tribution of each household would be given by equation (9). In our case, when wages
are observed, we account for random preferences by averaging over the distribution of
preferences conditional on observed wage rates. Thus the likelihood contribution for a
couple observed to work (hom, h
o
f ) hours with observed gross wage rate w
o
m, w
o
f (which
14This is akin to the full maximum likelihood approach of implementing the Heckman (1979) selection
correction rather than a two-step procedure.
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may contain measurement errors) would be given by
L =
∫∫
Pr[hom, h
o
f | w
o
m, w
o
f , ǫ
mr, ǫfr]f1(ǫ
mr, ǫfr | wom, w
o
f )φm(w
o
m)φf (w
o
f )dǫ
mrdǫfr, (11)
where f1 is the joint conditional density of ǫ
sr given observed wages wos , φm and φf are
the densities of male and female wage rates, and in general
Pr[hmj, hfj | wm, wf , ǫ
mr, ǫfr] (j = 1, ..., G), (12)
is the probability of the jth couple working (hmj , hfj) hours conditional on ǫ
sr and the
wage rate ws, (s = m, f).
15 For any given wm, wf , ǫ
mr, and ǫfr, (12) can be calculated
directly from (9) using (1) and (2) to obtain the values of U(yi, nmi, nfi).
The likelihood in the case where we do not observe wage rates for either member of
the couple is
L =
∫∫∫∫
Pr[hom, h
o
f | wm, wf , ǫ
mr, ǫfr]f(ǫmr, ǫfr, ǫwm, ǫwf)dwmdwfdǫ
mrdǫfr. (13)
f(ǫmr, ǫfr, ǫwm, ǫwf) is the joint density of random preferences and wage rates. The
complete likelihood function will be made up of expressions like (11) and (13) and the
intermediate cases where wages are only observed for one member of the household.
To minimize the complexities in solving a four-dimensional integral, we estimate
the model by simulated maximum likelihood. We allow the random preference of each
individual to be correlated with the error component in his or her own wage rate and
to be correlated with his or her spouse’s random preference. However, we impose zero
correlation between the error terms of partners’ wage rates and zero correlation between
an individual’s random preferences and his or her partner’s error in the wage equation.
15Throughout, we condition on the family’s non-labour income and other exogenous explanatory
variables xs and zs. These variables are suppressed in our notation.
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This implies that the correlation structure is
ǫ ≡ (ǫmr, ǫfr, ǫwm, ǫwf)′ ∼ N(0,Σ) (14)
where
Σ =


σ2rm σ
r
mf σ
rw
m 0
σrmf σ
2
rf 0 σ
rw
f
σrwm 0 σ
2
wm 0
0 σrwf 0 σ
2
wf


(15)
To solve the numerical integration problem, the integrals in the likelihood function
are approximated by a simulated multi-variate mean. In other words, for each individual
we take Q independent draws from the distribution of the error terms (ǫ) and compute
the average of the likelihood values conditional on the simulation draw. The integral
(13) can thus be approximated by
L =
1
Q
Q∑
q=1
Pr[hom, h
o
f | ǫ
wm
q , ǫ
wf
q , ǫ
mr
q , ǫ
fr
q ] (16)
where q = 1, ..., Q indexes the draw from (ǫ). Similarly, (11) can be replaced by
L =
1
Q
Q∑
q=1
Pr[hom, h
o
f | w
0
m, w
0
f , ǫ
mr
q , ǫ
fr
q ]φm(w
o
m)φf(w
o
f), (17)
where ǫfrq and ǫ
mr
q are based upon independent draws from their joint distribution.
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The resulting estimator is consistent if Q increases sufficiently fast with respect to the
number of sample observations, n. Specifically, if n1/2 1
Q
→ 0 and the draws from ǫ are
independent across observations, this method is asymptotically equivalent to maximum
likelihood. See Lee (1992), Gourieroux and Monfort (2002), or Hajivassiliou and Ruud
(1994) for examples.
16Similarly for the intermediate cases.
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5 The Determinants of Couples’ Labour Supply
5.1 Estimation Results
Estimation results for the labour-supply model are presented in Table 2, while those
from the wage equation are provided in Table 3. These simulated maximum likelihood
estimates are based upon Q = 20 draws per individual. The estimated utility function
is increasing in income for all observations so we did not need to make any adjustments
to the model in order to produce theoretically consistent results.
5.1.1 Determinants of Labour Supply
Due to the complex structure of the model, interpretation of the coefficients is not
straightforward. Nevertheless, the sign and significance of each parameter are informa-
tive about the direction of the effect and the precision with which it is estimated. For
example, the estimated determinants of the utility function (see the top panel of Table
2) describe the way in which specific characteristics affect preferences for non-market
time. A positive coefficient implies a positive effect of that variable on the marginal
utility of non-market time, and a subsequent negative effect on labour supply. Mean-
while, a positive coefficient (δs) in the fixed saving from nonwork equation (8) implies
that the factor has a positive effect on the fixed costs of working, decreasing labour force
participation.
Consistent with the literature, we find that family structure plays an important
role in determining preferences for non-market time through the utility function. The
presence of children causes men to prefer working more, whereas it increases women’s
preferences for non-market time, see top panel, Table 2. Similarly, estimates of equation
(8) tell us about the fixed costs of working, which, in addition to preferences, will also
affect labour supply. We find that the presence of children decreases the benefit of not
working which will act to increase the labour supply of both spouses. We note that the
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effect is significant for women and marginally insignificant for men. One interpretation
is that having more mouths to feed increases the (fixed) utility cost of not-working.
Together these results suggest that the presence of children has unambiguous effects
for men (increasing labour supply) but contradictory effects for women. In order to
determine the overall effect of the presence of children on husbands’ and wives’ labour
supply, we need to account for both of these effects.
To do this, we plot labour supply curves (wages against hours for husbands and wives
separately) in Figure 4 for two benchmark families. The two families are identical except
that in one family there is one child aged between 6 and 12, while in the other there
are two. The addition of the second child causes the father to work a bit more, while
the addition of the second child has a large negative overall effect on the wife’s labour
supply. Overall, we consistently find that an increase in the number of children causes
wives to decrease their labour supply indicative of the stronger effect of children through
the utility function, (1), relative to the effect through the fixed savings of non-working
equation, (8). It is also worth noting that the effect of younger children on women’s
preferences is larger than the effect of older children, consistent with the evidence that
women choose to provide care at home to pre-school age children. The availability of
public schooling for children over the age of five means that school-age children have less
effect on women’s decision to participate in the labour market. The effect of younger
and older children is roughly the same for husbands. From Figure 4, we also observe
that the effect of children on both parents’ labour supply is larger the higher are wives’
wages. This is also consistent with what others have found in Australia.
Once we control for speaking English in the home, we do not find any effect of being
born outside of Australia on husbands’ labour supply. For wives, however, we find that,
being foreign-born has a positive effect on labour supply. Furthermore, this effect is
stronger for more recent immigrants. It may be that immigrants choose to work harder
when they first arrive in order to establish themselves in Australia. It may also be
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the result of Australia’s selective immigration policy which is based upon health, age,
education, and occupation type.
We also find that unobserved heterogeneity plays a significant role in determining
labour supply. The standard deviation of the unobserved heterogeneity terms are signif-
icant for both men and women. However, the correlation between spouses’ preferences
(ρrmf ) is not significant (see Table 2) suggesting an absence of correlation in the unob-
served factors. There is still a complementarity in spousal non-market time through the
utility function, however, as A23 is positive and significant.
On the other hand, individuals’ random preferences are highly positively correlated
with the error terms in the wage equations, which may be due to higher productivity
individuals having higher preference for non-market time, to measurement errors in wage
rates, or some combination of the two. Gong and Van Soest (2002) find similar results
for Mexico.
The complex structure of the model also makes the parameters Aij hard to interpret.
They are important, however, as they determine the shape of the indifference curves and
hence capture the sensitivity of labour supply to changes in wages, taxes, and benefits.
For example, they determine the shape of the curves in Figure 4. It is interesting that
when the husband’s wage is low, the wife’s working hours tend to increase with her
partner’s wage (see Figure 4a), but when the husband’s wage exceeds about $10 per
hour, the working hours of the wife begin to decrease with further increases in her
husband’s wage. Comparing the husband’s response in Figure 4a to the wife’s response
in Figure 4b, we see that husbands are less responsive to own wages, which is also
reflected in the results from the simulations (see Section 5.2).
5.1.2 Determinants of Wages
The estimated wage equations are presented in Table 3 and our findings are consistent
with those standard in the literature. Age has a nonlinear effect on men’s wages,
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although age is not significantly related to the wage rate for women. There are positive
wage returns for native-born women and for foreign-born women who have lived longer
in Australia. English language ability, though not quite significant at standard levels,
matters in the way one would expect–i.e. those who speak a language other than English
at home earn less. We do not find significant differences for fluency in English after
controlling for speaking a different language at home, but this could be due to the
self-reported nature of the information. The return to education is higher for women
than for men. Significantly, women with a higher education earn 31 per cent more than
women who are Year 12 graduates while the analogous figure for men is 25 per cent.
5.2 Simulating Wage and Income Elasticities and the Effects
of Tax Reform
In this section we simulate the sensitivity of working hours to changes in wage rates and
non-labour income in order to shed light on our estimates. These simulations reflect
the “expected hours” for each individual computed as a probability weighted sum of
hours levels. From these, we compute average hours of work measures across the
whole sample. Wage and income elasticities are derived by increasing all wage rates or
incomes by one per cent and then calculating the percentage change in average hours.
The model provides a flexible method of examining a wide variety of policy changes and
the resulting change in hours worked is an outcome of interest to policy makers.
5.2.1 Goodness of fit
Table 4 presents the means of reported and simulated hours for men and women. These
numbers are point estimates. Standard errors (numbers in the parentheses) are obtained
by repeating the simulations for a large number of draws from the estimated asymptotic
distribution of the parameter estimates. The model predicts average hours of work very
well for both men and women. The model also predicts the frequencies of most hour
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categories very precisely, though it overpredicts the frequency of the 56-hour category
at the expense of the 40-hour category for both men and women.
5.2.2 The Elasticity of Labour Supply
Estimated wage and income elasticities are reported in Table 5. The second row shows
the labour force participation elasticities, while the third through the fifth rows are the
hours of work elasticities for the whole sample and for two sub-samples split by level
of educational attainment. It is important to note several things. First, the elasticities
of both men and women with respect to their partner’s wage and to family non-labour
income are negative and very small, although some are statistically significant. The
cross wage elasticities for wives are larger than those for husbands. In other words,
women respond more to their husband’s wage changes than the other way around. This
can also be seen from Figure 4. For example, in Figure 4b the labour-supply schedule for
men is nearly vertical, indicating that as the wife’s wage changes, her husband does not
change his labour-supply behaviour. The schedules for women in Figure 4a are much
flatter at low wages. This indicates that women do respond to their husbands’ wage
changes, particularly in the low wage range.
Own wage elasticities are positive for both men and women with women responding
more to their own wage changes than men. For example, for each one per cent increase
in his wage, a man will increase his working hours by 0.26 per cent, while women increase
working hours by 0.50 percent in response to a one per cent increase in own wages.
Response to wage changes varies by demographic group. Those who are relatively
educated are less responsive to changes in their own wages than are those with low
educational attainment.17 For example, for every one per cent increase in his own wage
a relatively educated man will increases his labour supply by 0.17 per cent, while the
17This finding is consistent with Kalb (1999) and Kalb (2000) who finds that wage elasticities are
larger in low income families. It is due in part to the fact that these individuals are already working,
on average, a large number of hours.
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labour supply of a man with relatively little education will increase by 0.30 per cent.
Highly-educated women react to a one per cent increase in their own wages by increasing
their labour supply by 0.39 per cent, while women with low education increase their
labour supply by 0.55 per cent.
The weekly family income in the first row of Table 5 represents the model’s prediction
of the new level of average family income after a ten per cent increase in the indicated
income source (wages or non-labour income.) Family income before any changes is
predicted to be $1,197. For example, if every husband’s wage is increased by ten per
cent, family after-tax income would be $1258, an average increase of $61. An increase
in non-labour income by the same proportion would bring a much smaller increase ($6)
to the family in after-tax income.18
5.2.3 The Effects of the 2005-2006 tax reforms
From the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 financial years, the Australian Government intro-
duced a tax reform package in which the marginal tax rate for income between $6,000
and $21,600 is lowered from 17 to 15 per cent and the threshold for higher tax rates
are increased. Notably, from 2006-2007, the income threshold for the highest tax rate
(47 per cent) – which was $65,000 in 2001– will be $125,000.19 In the last column of
Table 5, we present our prediction of the effects of these tax reforms based upon sim-
ulations from our estimated model. These calculations assume that everything about
the Australian population which is included in our model (particularly family structure
and age distribution) remains as in 2001, only the tax rates are allowed to change.
For predicting short-term impacts of these tax reforms, this ceteris paribus assumption
is reasonable. Long-term predictions, on the other hand, would involve incorporating
estimates of changing population structures into the simulation of the model.
18This last result partly stems from the fact that many households have little or no non-labour
income.
19For details of the tax reform package, see Commonwealth of Australia (2005).
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We find that the tax cuts are expected to increase the working hours of both husbands
and wives by 1.7 per cent on average. Husbands will increase participation by 0.82
percentage points and wives by 0.98 percentage points. Husbands’ hours respond more
than wives’ hours to the tax reform resulting in the same overall change in labour supply
(1.7 per cent increase) for both. Of course, the distribution of these effects is not uniform
across the population. Amongst men, the response of hours is stronger for those with less
education (1.77 per cent) and thus a large part of the overall increase in male working
hours is being driven by those in the lower education groups. The results also show that
the average weekly family income is expected to increase by approximately $60 as a
result of the tax cuts. For families with two wage earners, each making between $25,000
and $55,000 per year, our model predicts an average after-tax increase in income of
$38–much larger than the Australian Government’s own prediction of $12, which does
not include labour supply effects (see ABC News Online (2005)).
5.2.4 Comparison with other studies
Scutella (2001) estimates a single-equation labour-supply model for women, correcting
for sample selection but holding men’s hours and income constant, and finds small
labour-supply elasticities for women–around 0.11. Likewise holding men’s behaviour
constant, Jones and Savage (1996) estimate female labour supply in the context of a
demand system approach with a continuous budget constraint. They find a large average
wage elasticity of female labour market participants but they do not report any average
wage elasticities which would be comparable with the combined effect from participants
and non-participants reported in other papers.20
Kalb (2002) and Creedy and Kalb (2005) use a discretized family labour-suppply
20For married women already working, they report a compensated wage elasticity of 1.125. All of
the other papers, and our paper, report uncompensated wage elasticities, and this further complicates
direct comparison.
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model in an approach similar to ours.21. Creedy and Kalb (2005) report labour supply
elasticities quite similar to ours (0.25 for husbands and 0.54 for wives) for the subset of
married couples. Furthermore they find that a one per cent wage increase leads to a 0.14
percentage point increase in husband’s participation rate and a 0.19 percentage point
increase in wife’s participation rate. We find somewhat larger responses in the partici-
pation rate, with a one per cent increase in own wage leading to a 0.18 percentage point
increase in participation for men and a 0.35 percentage point increase in participation
for women. We hesitate to draw any conclusion from direct comparison of these figures
as these elasticities are not calculated in the same way.22
Using the estimates of Kalb (2002), Buddelmeyer et al. (2005) simulate the effect of
the 2005-2006 tax reforms. It is even more difficult to compare this paper to our results,
as they do not provide an estimate of the effect of the tax reforms on post-reform family
incomes which includes labour-supply effects.23 The one directly comparable estimate
from their study is the expected change in total average hours worked per week due to
the labour supply effects of the tax reform. They estimate, for the subset of individuals
in married couples who are already working, that husbands will work 0.14 hours more
and wives 0.11 hours more. We estimate much larger responses–0.78 additional hours
for husbands and 0.52 additional hours for wives–but our estimates include the hours
response of those who take up work after the change. Buddelmeyer et al. (2005) appear
to use the estimates from Kalb (2002) and Creedy and Kalb (2005), and the authors
report very similar labour-supply elasticities to ours. However, these estimates result in
very different changes in average hours, albeit measured differently, when applied to the
21These models are estimated using 1994-1998 data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey
of Income and Housing Costs. The models are also described in Kalb (1999) and Kalb (2000), although
only estimated on one year of data in those papers. The model is applied to analyze the effect of various
policy changes in Creedy et al. (2003), Kalb and Kew (2002), Kalb et al. (2002), and Kalb et al. (2002).
The general approach and main features of all of these papers are similar.
22We calculate the elasticity of the average. Thus, we calculate the average over all individuals (for
hours or participation) before and after the change and we report the change in this average. Kalb
(2002) instead calculates the elasticity for each individual and reports the average across individuals.
23They do analyze the impact on the government’s budget after accounting for labour-supply effects.
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tax reform.
This further highlights the difficulty of direct comparison between our paper and the
Australian literature using discretized labour-supply models which are all based upon
Kalb (2002). In addition to the difference in the method of calculating the elasticities
(see footnote(22)), there are a number of differences which might affect the results.
Specifically, the models are estimated on different data at different points in time.24
Moreover, the utility functions are specified differently and include a different set of
variables. Finally, the permissible labour supply points (specified by CS(wm, wf)) differ
between their model and our own and the fixed cost of working is specified differently.
Thus, comparison of our model with these does not lead to a direct evaluation of the
contribution made by the three methodological innovations which we have introduced
in this paper. All of these improvements extend the models described above. In the
next section, we undertake this direct evaluation.
5.3 Evaluating the improvements to the model
We have made three substantive specification changes to the standard, discretized struc-
tural labour-supply model. The first is to incorporate correlation in husbands’ and wives’
preferences for non-market time. This is captured by the term σrmf in equation (15).
The second is to allow for correlation between the unobservables, for each individual, in
the wage equation and the equation which captures preferences about the income/non-
market time tradeoff. This is captured by the terms σrwm (for men) and σ
rw
f (for women)
in equation (15). The third extension is to predict wages from equation (10) using the
linear predictor based upon the coefficient estimates and random draws from the distri-
bution of ǫwm and ǫwf .25 We find that the quantitative effect of these improvements is
substantial.
24A minor difference may also arise from our using de facto and married couples together. It is not
clear if Kalb (2002) includes de facto couples.
25We correct for selection as indicated in equation (10) and footnote 14.
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In order to undertake this evaluation, we re-estimate our model, “turning off” the
three new features of our model. We also adopt the standard estimation strategy of
separately estimating the wage equation in a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure and
using the predicted wage from that procedure as if it were the true wage (ignoring the
stochastic component).26 For the sake of conciseness, we do not present the estimation
results in the paper but they are available on request. Rather, we present simulated
wage and income elasticities and the predicted effect of the tax reform in Table 6. It is
clear that the wage elasticities are now less than half the size of those from our preferred
model (see Table 5).
We conclude that there are substantial differences which arise from our specification
improvements. Given that our correlation term between husbands’ and wives’ prefer-
ences is not significant, we believe that there are two things driving the differences in
results. The first is the correlation between wages and preferences. The other is the
unobserved measurement errors, which appear to be exacerbated if we ignore the noise
in estimating non-workers’ wages.
6 Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been to estimate a structural labour-supply model for
Australian couples. To this end, we develop a model which extends previous models by
allowing for random preferences for leisure for each spouse, correlation between these
preferences within a couple, and individual-specific correlation in the unobservable fac-
tors determining wages and preferences for leisure. These extensions produce a more
realistic model of labour-supply behaviour and have a significant impact on the resulting
26We make one adaptation of the approach taken in Kalb (2002) and the related papers, in which the
conditional predictor (i.e., including the inverse Mills-ratio in the predicted wage) is used. Including the
inverse Mills-ratio in the predicted wage will result in inconsistent predictions. The inverse Mills-ratio
is included in OLS estimation to produce consistent estimates of the coefficients in the linear predictor
term. Once these consistent coefficients are obtained, prediction should be based unconditionally on
the estimated linear predictor.
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estimates of labour-supply elasticities.
Our results indicate that women are more responsive to both their own wage changes
and their husbands’ wage changes than are their partners. Specifically, elasticities with
respect to own wages are on average 0.26 and 0.50, for men and women respectively.
We also find that more highly educated individuals are less responsive to their own
wage changes than are individuals with less education. Neither husbands nor wives are
particularly responsive to changes in nonlabour income or partner’s wages, although
most of the estimated elasticities are significantly different to zero.
In order to assess the quantitative impact of our modelling improvements, we esti-
mate a restricted version of the model that does not account for the unobservability of
non-workers’ wages, the correlation between wages and preferences for individuals and
within couples. The results suggest that ignoring these issues generates a downward
bias in the estimates of labour-supply elasticities. Specifically, the estimates implied by
the restricted model are half those of our preferred model.
Finally, we use the results of our labour-supply model to make predictions about
the likely labour-supply effects of the changes to the Australian tax system which came
into effect on 1 July 2005. We find that the tax cuts introduced by the government
are expected to increase both men’s and women’s labour supply by about 1.7 per cent
and to generate an extra $60 in family weekly income for the average Australian family.
Families with two wage earners each earning between $25,000 and $55,000 per year are
expected to see after-tax family income increase by $38 per week. This compares to
the government’s own prediction of an increase of $12 per week, which appears not
to include the effect of any labour-supply responses. This disparity demonstrate the
importance of accounting for individuals’ labour-supply reactions to government policy
in understanding the effects of policy changes. In particular, changes to the tax and
transfer system can induce strong labour-supply responses and a realistic assessment
of these responses is crucial to understanding and evaluating alternative policies. The
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model of this paper provides an improvement of existing methods of doing this.
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Tables
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations by Gender
Husbands Wives
Individual Variables Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Hours of Work 45.64 12.59 30.67 14.40
Wage 23.72 15.24 21.34 14.69
Non Labour Income ($1000 AUD) 6.200 20.79 4.592 23.97
Higher Education 0.256 0.244
Vocational Education 0.450 0.347
Completed Year 12 0.074 0.113
Less than Year 12 0.219 0.295
Age 42.3 8.7 40.1 8.5
Australian-born 0.771 0.787
English Speaking Background 0.125 0.099
Non-English Speaking Background 0.103 0.114
Years Since Arrival 5.3 11.7 4.5 10.8
Language other than English 0.080 0.092
Fluent English Speaker 0.073 0.082
Poor Health 0.016 0.014
Health Improved in Last Year 0.130 0.179
Health Worsened in Last Year 0.093 0.099
Household Variables Mean St. Dev.
Married 0.878
Kids Aged 0 - 5 0.468 0.77
Kids Aged 6 - 12 0.541 0.83
Kids Aged 13 - 15 0.230 0.49
Kids Aged 16 - 17 0.121 0.34
Kids Aged 18 - 20 0.043 0.31
Joint Credit Cards 0.360
Observations 1413
Source: Wave 2 HILDA
All variables are measured in percents except age (years), hours of work, non-labour
income (1000s of Australian dollars), number of kids, and years since arrival.
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Table 2. The Determinants of Couples’s Hours of Work
(Simulated Maximum Likelihood Coefficients and t-values)
Household
Coefficient t-value
Utility Function (Equation 1):
A11 -0.718 (-3.31)
A12 -0.379 (-3.00)
A13 -0.562 (-3.06)
A22 -2.831 (-14.22)
A33 -2.428 (-9.45)
A23 0.515 (5.28)
b11 22.238 (5.46)
Husband Wife
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Preferences βsk (Equation 2):
Constant 21.310 (6.16) 21.548 (4.73)
Kids 0 - 5 -0.353 (-2.92) 1.752 (8.71)
Kids 6 - 12 -0.354 (-3.22) 0.661 (3.83)
Kids 13 - 15 -0.280 (-1.54) 0.450 (1.76)
Kids 16 - 20 -0.567 (-3.52) 0.069 (0.29)
Health Improved 0.378 (1.82) 0.236 (1.01)
Health Worsened 0.230 (1.09) 0.450 (1.54)
Poor Health 3.598 (5.82) 4.189 (2.28)
Age 0.654 (0.61) 0.513 (0.33)
Age Squared -0.066 (-0.52) 0.001 (0.00)
Australian-born -0.632 (-1.58) 0.629 (1.09)
Years Since Arrval -0.150 (-1.01) 0.240 (1.12)
σr 1.338 ( 5.00) 1.225 (7.11)
ρrmf 0.332 ( 1.25) 0.332 ( 1.25)
ρrw 0.586 ( 4.14) 0.912 (14.65)
Fixed Saving from Not Working δj (Equation 8):
Constant 0.887 (1.10) 1.737 (3.17)
Kids 0 - 5 -0.069 (-1.26) -0.056 (-1.83)
Kids 6 - 12 -0.006 (-0.12) -0.073 (-2.67)
Kids 13 - 15 -0.139 (-1.73) -0.080 (-1.86)
Kids 16 - 20 0.087 (1.21) -0.035 (-0.84)
Age -0.355 (-0.95) -0.586 (-2.21)
Age Squared 0.062 (1.43) 0.075 (2.31)
Australian-born 0.207 (1.43) -0.137 (-1.40)
Years Since Arrival 0.050 (0.96) -0.050 (-1.35)
lnSL∗ -6688
∗ ln SL: simulated log likelihood.
t-values are in parentheses.
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Table 3. The Determinants of Wages
(Simulated Maximum Likelihood Coefficients and t-values)
Equation 10 Husband Wife
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant 2.509 (7.07) 2.218 (5.66)
Age 0.282 (1.72) 0.243 (1.33)
Age Squared -0.030 (-1.59) -0.022 (-1.03)
Australian-born 0.054 (0.83) 0.184 (2.41)
Years Since Arrival 0.009 (0.43) 0.048 (1.81)
NSW -0.225 (-4.65) -0.062 (-1.25)
Melbourne -0.046 (-1.05) -0.009 (-0.18)
VIC -0.307 (-5.39) -0.102 (-1.80)
Brisbane -0.170 (-2.91) -0.068 (-1.20)
QLD -0.263 (-4.93) -0.141 (-2.60)
Adelaide -0.207 -2.94) -0.120 (-1.49)
SA -0.340 (-3.87) -0.154 (-1.97)
Perth -0.176 (-2.83) -0.148 (-2.50)
WA -0.222 (-2.56) -0.156 (-1.69)
Tas -0.292 (-3.34) -0.159 (-1.39)
NT 0.206 (1.11) -0.168 (-1.15)
ACT 0.016 (0.17) -0.017 (-0.17)
Higher Education 0.252 (3.95) 0.310 (6.11)
Vocational Education -0.054 (-0.86) -0.045 (-0.93)
Less than Year 12 -0.109 (-1.61) -0.176 (-3.47)
Language other than English -0.396 (-1.49) -0.384 (-1.49)
Fluent English Speaker 0.166 (0.62) 0.348 (1.35)
σw 0.425 (55.73) 0.387 (57.35)
t-values are in parentheses.
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Table 4. Simulated Working hours
(Comparison of sample means to implied means from model)
Husband Wife
Sample Simulated Sample Simulated
Average hours 40.849 40.699(0.60) 21.509 22.340(0.59)
0 hours(%) 10.7 10.656(1.0) 32.1 30.459(1.3)
8 hours(%) 1.0 01.284(0.2) 6.1 7.0(0.5)
16 hours(%) 1.1 02.152(0.2) 8.4 9.4(0.4)
24 hours(%) 2.5 05.025(0.3) 13.4 11.7(0.4)
32 hours(%) 5.4 09.884(0.4) 11.0 13.2(0.4)
40 hours(%) 31.4 16.985(0.4) 18.7 12.6(0.5)
48 hours(%) 27.5 23.581(0.6) 6.4 9.7(0.5)
56 hours(%) 6.6 21.929(0.7) 1.8 5.0(0.4)
64 hours(%) 13.7 08.700(0.6) 2.2 1.3(0.3)
Numbers are percentages of individuals in each discrete hour category.
Percentages in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors.
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Table 5. Simulated labour-supply and income elasticities from preferred model
Own Wage Cross Wage Own Income Cross Income Tax reform
Husband
Family income 1256.68(10.65) 1203.02(10.11) 1257.49(11.03)
Participation 0.1759(0.021) -0.0184(0.007) -0.0004(0.001) -0.0003(0.001) 0.819(0.10)
Hours:
Whole sample 0.2634(0.032) -0.0165(0.011) -0.0029(0.001) -0.0010(0.001) 1.698(0.21)
High educated 0.1664(0.021) -0.0122(0.009) -0.0043(0.001) -0.0029(0.001) 1.554(0.19)
Low educated 0.2999(0.037) -0.0273(0.012) -0.0024(0.002) -0.0003(0.001) 1.752(0.22)
Wife
Family income 1236.93(10.91) 1201.73(10.11)
Participation 0.3500(0.039) -0.0028(0.023) -0.0012(0.001) -0.0007(0.002) 0.983(0.22)
Hours:
Whole sample 0.5025(0.060) -0.0348(0.035) -0.0050(0.002) -0.0033(0.003) 1.731(0.40)
High educated 0.3872(0.046) -0.0894(0.031) -0.0055(0.002) -0.0054(0.003) 1.853(0.44)
Low educated 0.5484(0.068) -0.0131(0.037) -0.0048(0.002) -0.0025(0.003) 1.683(0.39)
The average family income predicted by the model before any changes is $1197.24(10.12)
The rows correspond to changes in family income, participation and working hours,
which result from the change indicated in the column headings.
Changes in participation are measured in percentage points while changes in hours are
measured as a percentage of hours. The family income values are the average levels
after the simulated change.
We simulate one per cent changes in wage and non-labour income for columns two, three,
and five.
The tax reform column provides the simulated results from the tax cuts only (see
subsection (5.2.3)).
The new levels of family income in the column labelled ‘own income’ are the result of
increasing non-labour income by ten per cent. The changes in the participation rate
and hours in that column are those resulting from a one per cent change in
non-labour income.
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Table 6. Simulated labour-supply elasticities (restricted model without improvements)
Own Wage Cross Wage Own Income Cross income Tax reform
Husband
Family income 1235.20(9.53) 1189.97(9.02) 1232.70(9.81)
Participation 0.098(0.026) 0.009 ( 0.014 ) -0.001(0.004) -0.001(0.002) 0.404(0.047)
Hours:
Whole sample 0.111(0.043) -0.013( 0.023 ) -0.007(0.005) -0.004(0.003) 0.587(0.101)
High educated 0.071(0.026) -0.027( 0.021 ) -0.008(0.005) -0.006(0.003) 0.588(0.097)
Low educated 0.126(0.050) -0.008( 0.024 ) -0.006(0.005) -0.004(0.003) 0.586(0.104)
Wife
Family income 1214.50(9.76) 1188.81(9.01)
Participation 0.189(0.051) -0.001(0.050 ) -0.001(0.003) -0.001(0.005 ) 0.495(0.116)
Hours:
Whole sample 0.239(0.082) -0.079(0.085 ) -0.007(0.005) -0.008(0.007 ) 0.387(0.234)
High educated 0.198(0.072) -0.114(0.086 ) -0.007(0.004) -0.010(0.007 ) 0.356(0.278)
Low educated 0.254(0.086) -0.066(0.086 ) -0.006(0.005) -0.007(0.007 ) 0.398(0.219)
The average family income predicted by the model before any changes is $1184.37(9.00)
Table entries are defined as in Table 5.
Percentages in parentheses are standard errors
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Figures
Figure 1. Budget surface of a typical Australian family
This is the budget set for a family with one 6 year-old child, husband’s hourly wage
$23, wife’s hourly wage $20, husband’s non-labour income of $123 and wife’s non-labour
income of $0.
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Figure 2. Distribution of working hours (husbands and wives)
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Figure 3. Distribution of hourly wage (husbands and wives)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
D
en
si
ty
0 2 4 6
log hourly wage (males)
0
.
5
1
1.
5
D
en
si
ty
0 2 4 6
log hourly wage (females)
39
Figure 4. Labour Supply (by husband’s and wife’s wages)
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Appendices
Table A. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Kids Aged 0 - 5 Number of children under 6
Kids Aged 6 - 12 Number of children between 6 and 12
Kids Aged 13 - 15 Number of children between 13 and 15
Kids Aged 16 - 17 Number of children between 16 and 17
Kids Aged 18 - 20 Number of children between 18 and 20
Age age in years
Married dummy, 1 if married, 0 defacto
Higher Education dummy, 1 if received higher education
Vocational Education dummy, 1 if received vocational education
Completed Year 12 dummy, 1 if completed year 12
Less than Year 12 dummy, 1 if did not finish year 12
Language other than English dummy, 1 if speak at home a language other than English
Fluent English Speaker dummy, 1 if fluent in English
rent dummy, 1 if renting home
mortgage dummy, 1 if paying mortgage for home
Poor Health dummy, 1 if poor health
Health Improved dummy, 1 if health improved
Health Worsened dummy, 1 if health worsened
Australian-born dummy, 1 if born in Australia
Years since arrival years lived in Australia
Sydney dummy, 1 if Sydney
NSW dummy, 1 if New South Wales (except Sydney)
Melbourne dummy, 1 if Melbourne
V IC dummy, 1 if Victoria (except Melbourne)
Brisbane dummy, 1 if Brisbane
QLD dummy, 1 if Queensland (except Brisbane)
Adelaide dummy, 1 if Adelaide
SA dummy, 1 if South Australia (except Adelaide)
Perth dummy, 1 if Perth
WA dummy, 1 if Western Australia
Tas dummy, 1 if Tasmania
NT dummy, 1 if Northern Teritory
ACT dummy, 1 if Australian Capital Territory
Hours of work hours worked per week
Wage hourly wage rate
Non-labour income non-labour income in $1000
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